UK dependence on American big tech is a national security risk, report warns
The UK’s dependence on a handful of American tech giants has gone beyond being just an economic issue and turned into a red flag for the country’s security.
That is the takeaway from a recent report published by the Open Rights Group (ORG), a British digital rights organization, with backing from UK parliamentarians.
The document pulls no punches: the concentration of critical services in the hands of a few US companies exposes British infrastructure to real risks, especially at a time when relations between the two countries are far from smooth.
And this is no exaggeration.
With geopolitical tensions heating up — involving issues like Greenland and conflicts in the Middle East — the report raises a point that many people still overlook: what happens to the UK’s essential systems if the US decides to tighten the screws through sanctions?
The answer to that question is what makes this debate so urgent right now. 👇
When technological convenience becomes vulnerability
For years, the UK — like most Western nations — built its digital infrastructure on platforms and services provided by companies like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and other American giants. The logic was straightforward: they were the best options available, with global scale, robust support, and competitive pricing. Nobody was wrong in making that choice at the time. The problem is that, over the years, that convenience quietly morphed into something far more delicate — a structural dependence that now runs through hospitals, government agencies, emergency services, and the country’s financial systems.
The ORG report details how entire sectors of the British government operate on infrastructure controlled by foreign companies, without clear alternatives or consolidated contingency plans. That means a decision made in Washington — whether driven by political pressure, regulatory changes, or even a trade dispute — could have direct and immediate effects on the UK’s operational capacity. And when we are talking about critical systems like public health, defense, and government communications, that level of exposure stops being just a business risk and becomes a matter of national security.
What makes this scenario even more concerning is the asymmetry of the relationship. American tech companies have no legal obligation to prioritize British interests in the event of a conflict with US interests. They operate under American jurisdiction, answer to the American government, and in extreme situations can be pressured to restrict services to specific countries or entities. The UK, in this arrangement, is essentially a customer — and customers can lose access.
According to the ORG itself, big tech companies have used their power and resources to control markets, limit innovation, and lobby the government, capturing the country’s critical infrastructure market. The group added that this excessive dependence on foreign companies has become an urgent national security issue as US foreign policy actions generate geopolitical uncertainty.
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The real risk of American sanctions
One of the central concerns in the report is the ability of the United States to impose sanctions that directly affect the supply of technology services to foreign governments and institutions. And this is not theory — it has already happened in practice.
The report cites the recent case where the US sanctioned the International Criminal Court (ICC), leading Microsoft to block the email account of the institution’s chief prosecutor. This happened after the US opposed the ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In other words, an American political decision directly impacted the operations of an international organization through control over digital infrastructure.
Now imagine that same kind of pressure applied to the UK. The report states that, should the relationship between London and Washington deteriorate — over issues like Greenland or Iran — the US could use its corporate dominance over critical British infrastructure as a tool for political leverage. It is an uncomfortable scenario, but one the document treats as something that needs to be anticipated and planned for.
Beyond sanctions, there is also the risk of surveillance over sovereign data. The report warns that, through the US Cloud Act, American agencies can access data stored on US cloud services. That means sensitive British government information hosted on platforms like Azure or AWS is potentially within reach of American authorities. On the other end, Chinese tech companies also pose a risk, since China’s national intelligence laws require companies to cooperate with the government and the country’s intelligence services.
The lock-in problem and hidden costs
Beyond geopolitical risks, the report addresses an issue that any IT professional knows well: vendor lock-in. The UK government has become dependent on strategic IT vendors and consultancies that, over the years, have created a scenario where government departments are trapped in a particular vendor’s technology. This situation makes them vulnerable to overcharging and budget overruns.
The numbers back this up. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) estimated in a report published last year that the country could be paying up to 500 million pounds more per year in cloud services than it would if the market were more competitive. We are talking about half a billion pounds that could be directed toward investments in technological sovereignty, local innovation, and public service improvements.
That astronomical figure is a direct consequence of a market dominated by a handful of global players, where the British government’s bargaining power is reduced and migration to alternatives becomes increasingly expensive and complex over time. The longer a system remains locked into a proprietary ecosystem, the higher the transition cost and the lower the incentive to seek alternatives — creating a self-reinforcing cycle.
The geopolitical context that changed the game
The discussion around digital sovereignty is not new, but it has taken on a different urgency with shifts in the global geopolitical landscape. Relations between the UK and the United States, described for decades as a special partnership, are going through a period of real tension. Trade disputes, foreign policy disagreements, and shifts in posture within the American government itself have created an environment of uncertainty that once seemed unthinkable between such close allies. And it is precisely in this context that technological dependence stops being an abstract debate and becomes a concrete concern for lawmakers and security experts.
The ORG report argues that the current moment demands the UK start asking questions that once seemed unnecessary: what if access to certain services is cut off? What if government data stored on American servers becomes subject to access requests from US authorities? What if critical security updates are suspended as a tool of diplomatic pressure? These are hypothetical questions, but the report treats them as scenarios that need to be planned for — not ignored.
Beyond that, the broader context of technology geopolitics shows that other countries are already well ahead in this conversation. The European Union, for example, has made considerable progress with regulations like the Data Act and the AI Act, as well as initiatives like the GAIA-X project, aimed at creating a sovereign data infrastructure for the bloc. France and Germany have explicit policies to reduce dependence on external vendors for critical systems. The UK, which left the European Union partly to gain more regulatory autonomy, now needs to show that this autonomy includes the digital dimension as well — and that means making tough decisions about where and how to build its digital infrastructure for the future. 🇬🇧
Open technology as a path to sovereignty
One of the main recommendations in the ORG report involves the large-scale adoption of open technology — open-source software, interoperable standards, and solutions that can be audited, modified, and controlled independently by the British government itself. This approach is not just a philosophical stance on openness and transparency; it has direct practical implications for the country’s digital sovereignty. When a government relies on proprietary software controlled by a foreign company, it is essentially outsourcing part of the control over its own systems — and that includes decisions about updates, features, data access, and even service continuity.
Open technology solves much of this problem by allowing the UK to maintain internally the knowledge and capability to operate, adapt, and evolve its own systems. Countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark already use customized Linux distributions in government agencies, develop encrypted communication solutions based on open-source code, and require technology vendors to allow independent auditing of their systems. This is not about rejecting American technology or creating digital isolation — it is about ensuring that viable alternatives exist and that the state does not become hostage to decisions made beyond its borders.
The ORG went further and cited European Union research indicating that every pound invested in open-source technology generates a four-pound economic return. So it is not just a security issue. It is also a significant economic opportunity to boost local innovation and strengthen the British tech ecosystem.
The report also highlights that the transition to more open and sovereign models does not need to be a radical, immediate break. It can — and should — be done gradually, strategically, and with careful planning, starting with the most critical systems and expanding progressively. The important thing is that this transition starts now, with clear goals and adequate resources. Every year of inaction is another year of deepened dependence, more contracts renewed with external vendors, and more difficulty making the shift in the future. The cost of acting today is lower than the cost of having to act under pressure tomorrow. ⚙️
What British lawmakers are saying
The ORG report is not sailing alone. Parliamentarians from different parties in the UK have expressed support for the document and are already signaling concrete paths forward.
Liberal Democrat MP Tim Clement-Jones argued that the government should change its public procurement rules to favor British cloud providers, allowing them to scale up. He was blunt in stating that procurement rules need to change to favor UK-based providers. Clement-Jones also called for more incentives for open-source software vendors and for the development of sovereign artificial intelligence models, lamenting the absence of a holistic and integrated government strategy on the issue.
Labour MP Clive Lewis was even more emphatic. He pointed out that the British government’s dependence on companies like Palantir has left the country dangerously vulnerable. For Lewis, given the growing geopolitical uncertainty driven by US and Israeli military actions, the UK needs to ensure it has control over its critical digital infrastructure. He called digital sovereignty a priority that cannot be delayed.
Sian Berry, Green Party MP, echoed the sentiment, stating that digital sovereignty should be a top government priority. She stressed that, with ongoing global instability, it is essential to build far more resilience to protect critical digital infrastructure against threats of sanctions and service withdrawal.
The convergence of voices from across the political spectrum shows that the topic is maturing in British public debate and that pressure for concrete changes is likely to increase in the coming months.
What is at stake for British infrastructure
When the report talks about risks to digital infrastructure, it is not being dramatic — it is being precise. Modern digital infrastructure is not just about websites and apps; it includes the systems that control energy supply, food distribution logistics, communications between security forces, electronic patient records in hospitals, and the payment systems that keep the country’s economy moving every single day. If any of these systems depends on services hosted on American clouds or on software whose license keys sit on servers in the US, the risk is real and measurable.
The document also points out that national security in the 21st century is no longer defined solely by military strength or a country’s economic reserves. It is increasingly defined by a state’s ability to keep its essential functions running autonomously, regardless of external pressures. In that sense, digital sovereignty is a natural extension of political sovereignty — and treating it as secondary or as purely a private sector issue is a strategic mistake that could have serious consequences.
British lawmakers who backed the ORG report have already signaled their intention to push the government to create concrete policies for technological diversification, with a preference for solutions that allow greater national control over critical data and systems. The discussion is on the table — and the report serves as an important reference document to support those political decisions with solid data and technical analysis.
What the UK can learn from other countries
It is worth reinforcing that the pursuit of digital sovereignty is not a radical or isolationist idea. It is a global trend being adopted by developed economies around the world. Germany has invested heavily in open-source alternatives for its government systems. France created a national sovereign cloud strategy. The Netherlands and Denmark are making strategic investments in technology based on open standards and publicly available software.
These countries have understood that excessive dependence on foreign vendors for critical systems is not just a technical problem — it is a strategic risk that compromises the autonomy of the state. And they are acting accordingly, with public investment, changes to government procurement rules, and incentives for the local tech ecosystem.
The UK has talent, academic infrastructure, and a vibrant startup ecosystem. What is missing, according to the ORG report and the lawmakers who support it, is an integrated strategy that connects all these elements around a common goal: ensuring the country has real control over its own digital infrastructure.
A debate that can no longer wait
The Open Rights Group report puts on the table a debate that goes far beyond technology preferences or commercial disputes between companies. It touches on fundamental questions about autonomy, resilience, and a state’s ability to function independently in a world that is increasingly interconnected — and increasingly unstable.
The central message is clear: digital sovereignty is not a luxury or a futuristic aspiration. It is a present-day necessity that demands coordinated action, strategic investment, and political will. The UK has all the resources to build an alternative path — what is missing is the decision to start walking it. And, as the report itself suggests, the time to make that decision is now, before geopolitical circumstances make that decision for them. 🔐
