Tech regulation has become the stage for a dispute that goes way beyond labs and servers.
On July 17, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping took the stage at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai and delivered a speech that everyone in Silicon Valley probably heard — whether they wanted to or not.
The message was blunt: artificial intelligence cannot be the property of a single country. In his words, AI development should not be a solo performance by one nation, but a symphony of international cooperation. And it was impossible not to see a well-aimed jab at the United States in there.
To prove he wasn’t just talking a big game, China formally launched WAICO — the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation — an alliance with 29 founding countries, headquartered in Shanghai, with UN Secretary-General António Guterres in attendance at the opening ceremony.
That’s no small thing.
This AI alliance brings together names like Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa, Senegal, Pakistan, and Malaysia, with a stated goal of promoting international cooperation and building an AI regulation model that is safe and beneficial for humans — especially for developing nations.
What looks like a diplomatic move actually has much deeper layers:
- A multi-billion dollar tech rivalry between China and the United States
- A chip war that still has no winner
- And a race to decide who gets to write the rules of AI for the world
The question is simple: what changes now that China has an international AI organization with real weight at the UN? 🤔
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The answer might be more impactful than it seems at first glance.
What Xi Jinping actually said in Shanghai
During his speech at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference, Xi Jinping called on countries to embrace what he described as a historic opportunity offered by open-source AI. He emphasized that China has been playing a role in ensuring equitable access to AI capacity-building for developing nations, with the goal of preventing the creation of new historical injustices. And he went further: he announced Beijing’s plans to continue cooperating with countries across Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
One of the most striking moments of the speech came when Xi argued that countries should jointly oppose the exaggeration of national security concerns in the AI field, criticizing the idea of placing one country’s security above everyone else’s. It was a clear response to restrictions imposed by the United States, which justifies its sanctions on national security grounds.
The Chinese president also reinforced the need for a people-centered approach that ensures AI always remains under human control. To that end, he cited concrete safeguards such as regulations, technological monitoring, early warning systems, and emergency response mechanisms. In other words, it’s not just about innovation — it’s about building a security framework that makes sense on a global scale.
What WAICO is and why it matters so much
WAICO didn’t appear overnight. It was formally established on July 16, 2026, but Beijing had been signaling the idea of a global AI alliance since 2025, when Chinese Premier Li Qiang first laid out the plans for the organization. It’s the result of a strategic move China has been building for years, positioning Shanghai as the nerve center of a new global tech order.
With 29 founding countries right out of the gate, the organization launches with a solid geopolitical foundation — and with a direct appeal to nations that have historically been left out of major decisions about technology. The fact that countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa are among the founding members is no coincidence. It’s a calculated play to attract the so-called Global South, which represents more than half the world’s population and a growing share of digital consumption.
António Guterres’ presence at the opening ceremony wasn’t just ceremonial, either. When the UN Secretary-General shows up to inaugurate an organization led by China, the signal sent to the rest of the world is unmistakable: this has international legitimacy. It’s not a closed club of political allies — it’s a structure that aims to position itself as a real alternative to Western tech regulation initiatives, like the European AI Act and United States executive orders.
But beyond the symbolism, the organization arrives with a concrete proposal: to promote international cooperation and develop AI regulation across different countries, ensuring that the technology is beneficial and safe for people. Analysts point out that Beijing will likely use the alliance to shape how AI policies are discussed within the UN. For many of the member countries, which can’t individually compete with the tech giants of the U.S. or China itself, belonging to this network represents access to resources, technology, and influence that once seemed far out of reach.
The chip war and the fight over global AI standards
Xi Jinping didn’t go to the World Artificial Intelligence Conference just to launch an organization. He went to stake a claim in a debate that, over the next few years, will define how billions of people interact with technology, how governments make decisions, and how companies operate at a global scale.
The tension with the United States becomes evident when you look at the broader context. AI is a fundamental pillar of Chinese industrial policy, and Beijing has invested heavily to build a self-sustaining domestic ecosystem, spanning everything from chip production to end-consumer applications. This fueled the so-called Chip War with the U.S., with both sides racing to control the production of semiconductor-based technologies, from advanced military weapons to AI-powered systems.
While China still trails the United States in access to the most advanced semiconductors, it holds an advantage on one crucial front: energy. Beijing already generates more than double the electricity of the U.S., a lead that’s set to grow even further thanks to aggressive, state-led investment in the country’s power grid. Since training and running AI models requires massive amounts of energy, this abundance of cheap electricity has become a strategic asset. On top of that, China dominates the production of rare earth minerals, which are essential for chip manufacturing.
In May 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce reaffirmed restrictions on shipping critical semiconductors to subsidiaries of Chinese companies headquartered or controlled in China. Beijing responded in kind, blocking exports of dual-use technology and critical minerals to American companies. In this environment of mutual distrust, the creation of WAICO serves as both a symbolic and practical response: if access to technology is going to be blocked by sanctions, China builds its own ecosystem — and invites the world to join it.
Brazil inside this AI alliance
Brazil’s participation as a founding member of WAICO deserves special attention, because it reflects a stance the country has been increasingly adopting: acting as a bridge between different power blocs without tying itself exclusively to any of them. Being part of the AI alliance alongside China and Russia, but also alongside countries with quite different profiles like Indonesia and Malaysia, is a choice that carries implications for both foreign policy and the domestic tech agenda.
Brazil is still in the early stages of building national-scale AI infrastructure, and being part of an organization with this kind of weight could mean access to resources and partnerships that speed up that process. On the other hand, international cooperation within WAICO doesn’t come without complications. Brazil also maintains close relationships with the United States and the European Union, which have very different views on how AI should be regulated, developed, and governed.
Navigating between these worlds without creating unnecessary friction takes diplomatic skill — and clarity about what the country wants to gain from each of these relationships. So far, Brazil has managed to maintain that balance, but as the tech disputes between the major powers deepen, that tightrope keeps getting tighter.
From a practical standpoint, tech regulation is one of the areas where Brazilian participation in WAICO could generate real and relatively quick impact. The country is still building its regulatory framework for AI — and having access to discussions and models being developed in international forums can enrich that process in ways that go well beyond what would be possible in isolation. More than following a ready-made template, Brazil has the opportunity to contribute its own experiences, especially on topics like digital inclusion, access inequality, and the use of AI in public services.
Where WAICO fits in the global dispute
When Chinese Premier Li Qiang first revealed plans for WAICO in July 2025, analysts already saw a shift in strategy. Instead of simply exporting Chinese AI infrastructure, Beijing was setting its sights on something bigger: shaping global AI policies and institutions that reflect Chinese interests on the world stage — and, ideally, getting there ahead of the United States.
Many experts note that China has always had a cautious relationship with the internet, precisely because of its American origins and decentralized models, and has actively sought to shield itself internally. Acting preemptively in the face of a predictable global adoption of AI could help China flip that script, especially with the support of middle- and low-income allies, whose numbers carry significant weight in UN votes and decisions.
As governance expert Arindrajit Basu wrote in an analysis for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with Washington rapidly pulling back from global norm-setting processes on cyber and AI, and reducing its financial support for digital diplomacy more broadly, Beijing is eager to demonstrate its global leadership. And in doing so, it hopes to win the Global South’s buy-in for its vision of state-centered technology governance.
What comes next in this race
With WAICO officially in the game, the global landscape of tech regulation has become even more fragmented — and, at the same time, more interesting. There are now at least three major blocs trying to set the agenda for the future of AI: the European model, which prioritizes individual rights and regulatory precaution; the American model, which favors market-driven innovation with sector-specific regulation; and the model China is trying to build through WAICO, focused on multilateralism, sovereignty, and access for developing countries. None of these models will win on its own — and that’s precisely why organizations like this one have so much potential for influence.
What sets WAICO apart from other initiatives is the geopolitical scale of its founding base. With 29 countries from the start, it already launches with a level of representation that took similar initiatives years to achieve. And the fact that it has visible UN backing gives it a legitimacy that goes beyond China’s sphere of influence. Of course, it’s still too early to tell whether the organization will manage to turn intentions into concrete results — international governance is notoriously hard to put into practice. But the move itself has already changed the board, and any serious analysis of the future of AI needs to factor WAICO in.
What Xi Jinping set in motion in Shanghai isn’t just a new organization. It’s a bet that the future of artificial intelligence will be decided collectively — and that China wants to be right at the center of that decision. Whether that bet pays off, only time will tell. But one thing is already clear: the era in which two or three countries dictated tech rules for the rest of the world is being challenged harder than ever. 🌐
